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"I, Edward Bowen, do hereby agree to the foregoing conditions,
also to supply clay for the manufacture of the said goods in a
proper state, also to find all materials (with the exception of body
and glaze) and tools, and not to engage anyone else for the same
work for a term of five years.
"EDWARD BOWEN,
" GEORGE PEARSON."

Under this contract, Pearson, who was a skilled workman in the
manufacture of white glazed bricks and baths, did work for the
plaintiff. Pearson's wife, who had from childhood been brought
up in the same work as her husband, was under a contract with
the defendant Hall to do work similar to that which her husband
was doing for the plaintiff. Pearson was accustomed at mealtimes to visit his wife at Hall's works, and occasionally he assisted
her in her work during those visits, and also after business hours.
There was evidence that the defendant Fletcher had suggested to
Pearson he should enter into a contract in his wife's name with
Hall, who was aware of his visits, inasmuch as he received several
letters of remonstrance from the plaintiff upon the subject.
The plaintiff brought his action claiming damages against Hall
and Fletcher for enticing away and detaining Pearson from the
plaintiff's employment, and for harboring him, and also for an
injunction restraining Pearson from working for Hall and Fletcher,
and restraining Hall and Fletcher from employing Pearson. The
action was tried before MANISTY, J., who directed a verdict for the
defendants Hall and Fletcher.
The plaintiff obtained a rule nisi for a new trial against all the
defendants, on the ground that there was evidence against Hall
and Fletcher.
The rule was made absolute by the Queen's Bench Division
(COCKBURN, C. J., and BOwEN, J.; MANISTY, J., dissenting)
against Hall and Fletcher, but discharged as against Pearson.
The defendants Hall and Fletcher appealed.
The plaintiff also appealed against so much of the rule as was
discharged as against Pearson.
Jeif, Q. 0. (Boddam with him), for the defendants Hall and
Fletcher.-The contract between Pearson and the plaintiff was
not one of personal service. It did not bind Pearson himself to
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work at all. It did not constitute Pearson a servant to the plain.
tiff, and therefore Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, did not apply.
Pearson was a mere contractor. The judgment of Mr. Justice
MANISTY was right, and there was no evidence against either
Hall or Fletcher for any actionable wrong.
A. T. Lawrence, for the defendant Pearson.-There was no evidence at the trial that Hall had engaged Pearson, who was in no way
bound to continue working at Hall's. manufactory. This is not a
case in which equity could grant an injunction. The contract was
one for which damages would be sufficient remedy. I adopt as my
argument the judgment of Mr. Justice COLERIDGE (the dissenting
judge) in Lumley v. C-ye.
Matthews, Q. C. (Anstie with him), was called upon to confine
his argument to questions of law only.-The case is within the law
of master and servant: Ex parte Gordon, 3 W. R. 568. I desire
to adopt as my argument the judgments of the majority of the
court in Lumley v. Gye.
BRETT, L. J.-In this case we were of opinion at the hearing that
the contract was one for personal service, though not one which
established strictly for all purposes the relation of master and servant between the plaintiff and Pearson. We were of opinion that
there was evidence to justify a finding that Pearson had been
induced by the defendants to break his contract of service, that
he had broken it, and had thereby in fact caused some injury to
the plaintiff, We were of opinion that the act of the defendants
was done with knowledge of the contract between the plaintiff and
Pearson, was done in order to obtain an advantage for one of the
defendants at the expense of the plaintiff, was done from a wrong
motive, and would, therefore, justify a finding that it was done, in
that sense, maliciously. There remained, nevertheless, the question
whether there was any evidence to be left to a jury against the
defendants Hall and Fletcher, it being objected that Pearson was
not a servant of the plaintiff. The case was accurately within the
authority of the case of Lumley v. Gye. If that case was rightly
decided, the objection in this case failed.
The only question then, which we took time to consider, was
whether the decision of the majority of the judges in that case
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should be supported in a court of error. That case was so elaborately discussed by the learned judges who took part in it, that little
more can be said about it than whether, after careful consideration,
one agrees rather with the judgments of the majority, or with the
most careful, learned, and able judgment of Mr. Justice COLERIDGE. The decision of the majority will be seen, on a careful
consideration of their judgments, to have been founded upon two
chains of reasoning. First, that wherever a man does an act,
which, in law, and in fact, is a wrongful act, and such an act as
may, as a natural and probable consequence of it, produce injury
to another, and which, in the particular case, does produce such an
injury, an action in the case will lie. This is the proposition to
irte, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 264.
be deduced from the case of Aslby v.
If these conditions are satisfied, the action does not the less lie
because the natural and probable consequence of the act complained
of is an act done by a third person; or because such act, so done
by the third person, is a breach of duty or contract by him, or an
act illegal on his part, or an act otherwise imposing an actionable
liability. on him. It has been said that the law implies that the
act of the third party, being one which he has free will and power
to do or not to do, is his own wilful act, and therefore is not the
natural or probable result of the defendant's act. In many cases
that may be so, but if the law is so to imply in every case, it will
be an implication contrary to manifest truth and fact. It has been
said that if the act of the third person is a breach of duty or contract, or is an act which it is illegal for him to do, the law will not
recognise that it is a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's act. Again, if that were so held in all cases, the law would
in some refuse to recognise what is manifestly true in fact. If the
judgment of Lord ELLENBOROUGIH in Vicors v. Wilcocks, 2 Sm.
Lead. Cas. 553, requires this doctrine for its support, it is, in our
opinion, wrong. We are of opinion that the propositions deduced
above from Ashby v. White are correct. If they be applied to such a
case as Lumley v. Gye, the question is whether all the conditions
are by such a case fulfilled. The first is that the act of the defendant, which is complained of, must be an act wrongful in law and in
fact. Merely to persuade a person to break his contract may not
be wrongful in law or fact, as in the second case put by Mr. Justice COLERIDGE at p. 247. But if the persuasion be used for the
indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the
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defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious act,
which is in law and in fact a wrong act, and therefore a wrongful
act, and therefore an actionable act if injury issue from it.
We think that it cannot be doubted that a malicious act such as
above described is a wrongful act in law and in fact. The act
complained of in such a case as Lumley v. Gye, and which is
complained of in the present case, is therefore, because malicious,
wrongful. That act is a persuasion by the defendant of a third
person to break a contract existing between such third person and
the plaintiff. It cannot be maintained that it is not a natural and
probable consequence of that act of persuasion that the third person will break his contract. It is not only the natural and probable consequence, but by the terms of the proposition, which
involves the success of the persuasion, it is the actual consequence.
Unless there be some technical doctrine to oblige one to say so, it
seems impossible to say correctly in point of fact that the breach
of contract is too remote a consequence of the act of the defendant. The technical objections alluded to above have been suggested as the consequences of the judgment in Vicars v. Wilcocks.
But that judgment, when so used or relied on, seems to us to be
disapproved in the opinions given in the House of Lords in Lynch
v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577, and seems to us, when so used, to be
unreasonable. In the case of Lumley v. Gye, and in the present
case, the third condition is fulfilled, namely, that the act of the
defendant caused an injury to the plaintiff, unless again it can be
said correctly that the injury is too remote from the cause. But
that raises again the same question as has been just discussed. It
is not too remote if the injury is the natural and probable consequence of the alleged cause. That is stated in all the opinions in
Knight v. Ljnch. The injury is in such a case, in law as well as
in fact, a natural and probable consequence of the cause, because
it is, in fact, the consequence of the cause, and there is no technical
rule against the truth being recognised. It follows that in Lumley
v. aije, and in the present case, all the conditions necessary to
maintain an action on the case are fulfilled.
Another chain of reasoning was relied on by the majority in
Lumleyq v. Gye, and powerfully combated by Mr. Justice COLEIt was said that the contract in question was within the
RIDGE.
principle of the Statute of Laborers-that is to say, that the same
evil was produced by the same means, and that as the statute made
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such means, when employed in the case of master and servant
strictly so called wrongful, the common law ought to treat similar
means employed with regard to parties standing in a similar relation as also wrongful. If, in order to support Lumley v. Gye, it
had been necessary to adopt this proposition, we should have much
doubted, to say the least. The reasoning of Mr. Justice COLEas
RIDGE upon the second head of his judgment seems to us to be
not
is
it
think
we
But
conclusive.
quite
not
if
nearly as possible,
necessary to base the case upon this latter proposition. We think
the case is better supported upon the first and larger doctrine.
And we are, therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the Queen's
Bench Division was correct, and that the principal appeal must be
dismissed.
Lord SELBORNE, C.-There was also a cross-appeal by the
plaintiff against the defendant Pearson, who succeeded before the
Queen's Bench Division in getting the rule for a new trial discharged or refused as against himself, while it was made absolute
as to the other defendants.
Pearson was the workman who, having a special knowledge or
skill in the glazing of bricks, which gave a peculiar and exceptional
value to his services, contracted with the plaintiff to work for him
exclusively, if required so to do, during a certain period of time
(the plaintiff being reciprocally bound to employ no other person
in the same kind of work during the same period), and was afterwards induced by the other defendants to break that contract.
The relief asked against him in the action was injunction; an
interim injunction was granted before the trial, and the case went
down for trial against all the defendants at the same time, and
upon the same issues of fact. The effect of leaving the verdict to
stand in Pearson's favor would be to entitle him to judgment in
the action ; which cannot be right if his contract with the plaintiff
was broken in the manner alleged; and if, upon the evidence
given at the trial, that question of fact could properly be now
determined in Pearson's favor, it is impossible, upon the same evidence, it could be right to order a new trial as against the other
defendants.
We think, therefore, that the plaintiff's appeal must be allowed,
and that there ought to be a new trial as to all the defendants.
But as, when the proper time comes to give final judgment, the
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consequences of a verdict for the plaintiff will not necessarily be
the same as to Pearson and as to the other defendants, we think
that the judge at the trial ought to give such directions to the
jury as will enable the court, if the plaintiff should succeed, to
deal with the particular case of this defendant as may be just.
For this purpose they ought to be directed in the event of a verdict
for the plaintiff to find specially the amount of damages which they
think ought to be awarded against Pearson, 1, in the event of the
court thinking his case a proper one both for an injunction and
damages and 2, in the event of the court thinking it a proper one
for damages only, and not also for an injunction. See Lord
Cairn's Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27), sect. 2, and the'Judicature
Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), sect. 2, sub-section 6, and sect.
76.
The cases of Eills v. Croll, 2 Phill. 60, and 1 DeG. M. & G.
626 n ; Dietrich8en v. Cabbun, 2 Phill. 52; and Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. M\. & G. 604, 627 ; and the authorities in equity as
to covenants in restraint of trade, within certain limits of time
or place, may possibly require to be considered before the case as
To Pearson, in the event of a verdict being found against him, is
finally disposed of.
Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.-In this case as far as regards the defend
ant Hall, I am sorry to be obliged to differ from the Lord Ohancelloi
and from my brother BRETT. The facts are undisputed; and I
understand that all the members of the court are agreed that the
relation of master and servant did not, in the strict sense of
the word, exist between the plaintiff and the workman whom the
defendant induced to break his contract. That being so, the
point is neatly raised whether the opinion of the majority of the
judges, or the opinion of the dissentient judge, in the case of
L tmley v. Gye should prevail in a court which is not bound by
the decision in that case. I am of opinion that as we are not
bound by it we ought to overrule it.
I believe, if it is not admitted, at least it is the fact, that Lumley v. Gye stands alone. Cases more or less analogous to it are,
no doubt, cited in the judgments of the judges, relied upon as
authorities by the majority, but in my opinion, distinguished suc.
cessfully by the dissentient judge. Since its decision I cannot find
that its authority has ever been so acknowledged as to be followed
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i. any decided case which has found its way into the reports.
From its nature it cannot be a very common form of action, and
though, no doubt, it is quite fair to say that this may reasonably
account for the bareness of the reports, it ought also in fairness to
take away any weight from the circumstance that the case of Lurley v. Gye has stood so many years in the books without being in
terms questioned or overruled. No favorable observations have
been made upon it; and, at least in some text-books, where it is
treated as an authority, it is so treated with the qualification of a
semble. Further, it has certainly not obtained the unanimous
assent of the profession. The three judges who decided it, and
my two colleagues here are, no doubt, lawyers entitled to the
bighest respect; but there have been great lawyers who are well
known to have thought that it was wrongly decided. I may mention in particular Mr. Justice WILLES, no doubt the counsel who
argued unsuccessfully in the case, but one of the greatest jurists
of his day and his time.
This state of things I conceive leaves me free to express here
what has always been my own opinion-namely, that an action
does not and ought not to lie against a third person for maliciously
and injuriously enticing and procuring another to break a contract,
in a case where the relation of master and servant in the strict
sense does not exist. I do not propose to state at length my
reasons for this opinion. I could only recite the cases and re-state
the arguments of Sir JoHN COLERIDGE in Lumley v. Gye. I
agree with my brother BRETT that the conflicting views are stated,
as well as they can be stated, by the judges who respectively entertained them in that case; and that there is really no more to be
said about it. The question is, with which view do you agree;
and I have said, I differ from the majority.
Only one independent observation occurs to me to make. It is,
I believe, admitted that if a man maliciously endeavors to persuade
another to break a contract, but fails in his endeavor, the malicious
motive is not in itself a cause of action. It is, I believe, also
admitted, except by Sir WILLIAm ERLE, whom, I think, no one
has ever followed, that if a man endeavors to persuade another to
break his contract, and succeeds in his endeavor, yet if he does
this without what the law calls malice, the damage which results,
however great, is not in itself a cause of action; I mean, of course,
a ca-.se of action against him. But if the damage, which is not in
VOL. XXIX.-74

586

BOWEN v. HALL.

itself actionable, be joined to a motive which is not in itself
actionable, the two together form a cause of action.
This seems a strange conclusion, but I am reminded of the
analogies of libel and conspiracy, in both which it is said tha
malice makes that same thing actionable, which without it would
not be so. I venture to think that in this there is a fallacy. In
the instance of libel there is not even an apparent parallel, except
in cases of prima facie privilege. A statement in itself defamatory, made deliberately and intentionally, is, I apprehend, a ground
of action, however pure and even exalted may be the motive of
him who makes it. The case of privilege is an exception to the
general law. A statement which is defamatory and untrue, and
which may do irreparable damage, is yet protected under certain
conditions, on the ground that it is better for the general good that
individuals should occasionally suffer than that freedom of communication between persons in certain relations should be in any way
impeded. But the freedom of communication which it is desired
to protect is honest and tender freedom. It is not expedient that
liberty should be liade the "cloak of maliciousness;" and in such
a case the general law applies. It is not, I think, accurate to say that
the malice makes the statement actionable. Deliberate and intentional defamation is always actionable; and the law implies that a
man means what he does; save that under peculiar and exceptional
circumstances the law will not make the implication which it makes
in all others. So, too, in conspiracy. The gist of the civil action,
as of the criminal offence, is the act of conspiracy by two or more
minds to bring about certain ends by certain means. It is true
that each separate conspirator might not, 'in some instances, be
actionable, nor indictable, for attempting to do or even for doing
with the utmost malice what he becomes actionable or indictable
for conspiring to do with others. But here, too, I conceive that
from the act of conspiring to bring about the unlawful end, or to
use the unlawful means, the law implies that malice which is necessary in law to ground the action or support the indictment. If,
therefore, the suggested analogies be accurately looked at, I think,
with all deference, they turn out to be no analogies at all. I do
not know, except in the case of Lumley v. Gye, that it has ever
been held that the same person for doing the same thing under the
same circumstances with the same results, is actionable or not
actionable according to whether his inward motive was selfish or
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unselfish in what he did. I think the inquiries to which this view
of the law would lead are dangerous and inexpedient inquiries for
courts of justice; judges are not very fit for them; and juries are
very unfit. I think, therefore, that Lumleyl v. Gye should be
overruled, and that this action as against the defendant Hall is not
maintainable. As to the other defendant, Pearson, I agree with
the rest of the court.
Principal appeal dismissed; plaintiff's appeal allowed.
That an action at law will lie by a
person against any one who knowingly
entices away his servant, minor child, or
apprentice, or wrongfully prevents him
from performing his duty during the
existence of that relation, is abundantly
settled in the American law: Walker v.
Cronin, 107 Mas. 555; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. Il. 456; Plumnmer v. W'bb,
4 Mason 390; Stowe v. Heywood, 7 Allen 118; Sherwood v. Hlall, 3 Sumn.
127 ; Ames v. Union Railway Co., 117
M ss. 541 ; Noice v. Brown, 39 N. J.
Law 569; lMoodward v. WV'ashburn, 3
Denio 369; Jeter v. Blocker, 43 Ga.
331. And if the defendant has wrongfully entered the plaintiff's premises to
entice away his servants, it seems that
trespass quare claustua will lie, and the
loss of the service may be shown in
aggravation of damages: Haight v.
Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499 (1853.) And
there appears to be the same difference
of opinion in America as in England,
whether, in order to sustain an action,
it is necessary that the relation of master
and servant, strictly speaking, should
exist, or whether the action lies, whenaver and wherever the person enticed
away is under contract or duty to render personal services to the plaintiff.
See Haskins, v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601
(1874) ; Hewett v. Ontario, 44 N. C.
Q. B. 287; and Burgess v. Carpenter,
2 Rich. (S. C.) 7, for both views of the
subject. But, of course, it is essential
.nat the servant or apprentice be ulider
an existing contract, duty or relation
with or to the master, to remain in his

employment, which contract or duty the
defendant has induced the servant to
violate; for it is clear no action lies
against one for merely inducing a servant to leave his employer at the end of
his present contract with him, even
though the latter desired and intended
to re-employ him: Boston Glass Jfanufactory v. Binney, 4 Pick. 425 ; Yichol
v. Mlartyn, 2 Esp. 732. And for a similar reason, tie servant must have been
at the time in the actual service or employment of the plaintiff, either at will,
or otherwise. If he has already wrongfully left that service, without the defendant's influence, and then for the
first time is employed by the defendant,
the latter is not liable for "enticing him
away," whether liable or not in any
other form of action if lie continues to
employ him after notice. See Butterfield v. Ashley, 2 Gray 254; Caughey v.
Smith, 47 N. Y. 250; Sargent v. Mathewson, 38 N. H. 54 ; Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa 356. But the remedy by
action at law for damages may often be
inadequate, since irreparable damage
may be done by fraudulently enticing
away an employer's skilled workmen
at an important period in his business,
by which his whole works may be suddenly stopped or greatly embarrsscd in
their operation ; such labor may not be
readily supplied from other quarters, and
therefore courts of equity have power
in such cases, and do forbid by injunction
a party from employing another's workmen or servants who are under positive
contracts to remain a stated time with
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their employer, and also forbid the and the bill prayed for an injunction,
servant from leaving and going into but it was refused. Similar views were
the service of another; or in other apparently sanctioned in this country, in
words they have power in such cases &nquirico v. Benedetti, 1 Barb. 315 ;
to indirectly compel a specific perform- and Haight v. Badgeley, 15 Id. 499 ;
ance of a contract for personal service, Fredric&sv. Mayer, 13 How. Pr. 566 ;
as well as of other contracts, especially 1 Bosw. 267; Butler v. Galletti, 21
wherever, though the remedy at law is How. Pr. 465 ; Burton v. Marshall,
plain, it is clearly not adequate. It 4 Gill. 487. In the former, the defendmust be admitted there has been some ant, an opera singer, had contracted
with the plaintiff to sing in operas and
difference of opinion whether courts of
equity could enjoin a servant from viola- concerts throughout the United States
ting his contractin such cases, or whether and Canada, and that he would not
the master should be left to his remedy make similar engagements with any other
at law; and still more, perhaps, whether persons. EDwAnaS, J., in equity, held
such injunction, even if granted against that no injunction would lie to prevent
the servant, could also include the second such engagements, or to compel a speemployer, and restrain him also from cific performance, citing and approving
employing the servant, since he at least Kemble v. ltean, 6 Sim. 333. Hamblin
was under no contract relafion with the v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. Ch. 528, in 1835,
first employer. The leading case on had previously announced and acted
that side apparently is that of Kemble upon the same doctrine, apparently on
v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333, before Vice Chan- its own authority, and in ignorance of
cellor SHADwELL, in 1829. In that the similar case of Kemble v. Kean.
4
case, the defendant Kean, the actor, had The case of De .Rivafinoli v. Corsetti,
in writing agreed to act at the plaintiff's Paige 264, sometimes cited on the same
theatre for twenty-four nights, at a salary side, seems more properly not to be
of 50. for each night, and not to per- really in support thereof, since although
form at any other theatre in London the decision was adverse to the plaintiff
during his engagement with the plain- on other grounds, yet Chancellor WALtiffs ; but notwithstanding, he did en- WORTH says: "Upon the merits of the
gage to act at Drury Lane Theatre, case, I suppose it must be conceded that
before his contract was fulfilled with the complainant is entitled to a specific
The 'Lord Chancellor performance of this contract, as the law
the plaintiff.
granted an injunction appears to have been long since settled
(LYNDHURST)
ex parte, which upon a full hearing was that a bird that can sing and will not
dissolved by the Vice Chancellor. This sing, must be made to sing." This was
v.
was followed, in 1836, by Kimberley v. in 1833, several years before Kemble
iennngs, 6 Sim. 340, before the same Kean was published, though not until
judge. There, the plaintiffs, merchants after it was decided. A similar remark
7
at Birmingham, had employed the de- may be made of De 1bl v. Soldke,
admitwhile
which,
in
280,
Robertson
fendant, for the term of six years, as
clerk, traveller and bookkeeper, and he ting the general right to an injunction in
on
had agreed to remain in their employ, such cases, it was denied in that case,
and not to "work for, or be otherwise the sole ground that the plaintiffs did not
engaged or employed by any other per- then have, and would not at present
son during that time, without their have, any establishment in active operathe viowritten consent ;" but notwithstanding, tion, which could be injured by
Rice,
he had left the plaintiffs' service, and lation of the contract. Clarke v.
2 Wils. Ch. 157 (1819), is sometimes
commenced business on his own account;
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same proposition.
cited as sustaining tile
In that case the defendant had contracted
to write and prepare reports of cases
decided in the Court of Exchequer, for
the plaintiffs to publish, and subsequently
he contracted to furnish reports in the
same court for another publisher. Aninjunction to restrain him was refused ;
but apparently on the ground, 1. Tulnt
although he had agreed positively to
report for the plaintiffs, liehad not
agreed not to report for any other party,
and he might therefore do both ; and 2.
Because the plaintiffs had not agreed to
print and publish the reports for the
defendant, but were at liberty to relinquish the undertaking should they deem
it advisahle ; and as it was "quite clear
'
there is no mutuality in this agreement,"
the injunction was refused.
But the preponderance of modern
authority, and the analogies of the law,
seem to be deciledly in favor of the
equity jurisdiction in such cases. The
leading case in England is imley v.
Wagner, 5 De Gex and Smale 485,
affirmed on appeal in I De Gex, Mac.,
and Cord. 604, and 13 Eng. Law and
]Eq. R. 252 (1852). There the defendant, Johanna Wagner, had engaged to
sing at the plaintiff's theatre for three
months, and not at any other for that
period; but having subsequently contracted to do so, a bill was filed against
her and the second employer, asking
simply for an injunction against her
singing at his theatre, but not asking
for any specific performance of the
plaintiff's contract, and Vice Chancellor
PJnKER granted the injunction, which,
on appeal, was sustained in an elaborate
opinion by Lord ST. LEONARDS, and
Kemble v. Keen was disapproved of.
And Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. N. S.
432 ; 5 Weekly Rep. 867 (1857), follows Lumley v. Wagner.
The same question arose a few years
later in Massachusetts. One Cook had a
written contract with the Taunton Copper Manufacturing Company to work

for them, as a skilled workman, at an
annual salary of $1000, fnr tile period.
of five years. During that time the
New Bedford Copper Company was
organized, and by the offer of a larger
salary induced Cook to leave his employer and contract with them, anl he
actually did so; but upon a bill filed by
the Taunton Company against both Cook
and the New Bedford Company, after an
elaborate argument, an injunction was
granted against Cook, forbidding him
to violate his contract with the plaintiffs, and also restraining the New Bedford Company from employing him.
See 24 Boston Law Rep. 547 (1862).
This subject was very carefully examined by FREEDMAN, J., in the late
case of Daly v. Smith, before the Superior Court of New York city, 49 How.
'r. 150 ; 6 Jones & Spencer 158
(1874) ; and the authorities carefully
and discriininately classified, and an injunction was granted restraining an
actress from violating her agreement to
play at the plaintiff's theatre for a stated
period ; and the case is in full accord
with Lumley v. Magner, and the Taunton Copper 3fanf. Co. v. Cook. And
see also Hayes v. Wilo, 11 Abb. Pr.
(N. S.) 167.
Some of the older cases first cited
seem to have denied the injunction forbidding the violation of a contract,
unless the contract could be specifically
and affirmatively enforced in equity; but
according to modern equity practice,
this objection is not now insuperable.
See Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Union
Buttonhole Company, 1 Holmes 253, in
which the subject is very thoroughly
examined by LOWELL, J. .And the
analogies of the law certainly seem to
lead to the same conclusion. Why will
an injunction be granted against communicating to another the secrets of the
plaintiff's business, contrary to the
defendant's contract, or duty not to do
so, as held in Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare
241 ; 9 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 182.

